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HOW LEGACIES OF THE PAST AND WEAKNESS OF THE STATE BROUGHT 
VIOLENT DISSOLUTION AND DISORDER TO THE WESTERN BALKAN
1
 STATES
*
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The fall of communism in the 1990s preceded the break-up of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The dissolution process not 
only resulted in disorder for the entire region but was also accompanied by 
violent conflicts starting with the cessation of Slovenia in 1991, the so-called 
Ten-Day War, and culminating with the Macedonian interethnic conflict in 
2001. These conflicts caused many human victims, traumas and dislocation of 
civilians, not to mention the enormous economic cost
2
 it brought to the entire 
region. To give an idea to the dimensions of the problem, not only 
qualitatively but also quantitatively, some estimation can be suggested.  
In Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, the number of war-related deaths were 
estimated at 102,622 individuals, of which about 55,261 (54%) were civilian 
war-related deaths; the refugees and internally displaced persons according to 
UNHCR estimate around 1.2 million persons
3
; the number of rape victims 
range as high as 20,000 (European Community figures) to 50,000 (the 
Sarajevo State Commission for Investigation of War Crimes)
4
 while the 
Albanian anarchy in 1997 left some 2000 people dead
5
. Besides the probable 
disputes on the exact estimations it can be said that these civilian disasters are 
considerable numbers taking into account also the region‘s small population 
(approximately 25 million).  
Furthermore, the process of disintegration in ex-Yugoslavia not only 
regards the immediate aftermath period of the collapse of communism. It still 
is an unfinished business, lately revealed through the independence of 
Montenegro (in May 2006) and that of Kosovo (in February 2008). Unlike the 
first ‗rapid‘ disintegrations, the later ‗slow‘ dissolution is marked by a more 
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peaceful manner where we have the independence of Montenegro gained 
through democratic referendum without any violent confrontation and in the 
case of Kosovo, although strong divergences exist between the two parties, 
they publicly have ruled out the use of military action or any use of force. 
Apart from the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Albanian state also 
underwent hard times. In the spring of 1997 the Albanian state collapsed, 
―representing a classic case of state failure where the structures that should 
have guaranteed the rule of law failed completely‖6 and as a consequence 
resulted in many civilian victims.  
 
This entire chaotic situation has exposed the Western Balkan region to 
violent conflicts for almost a decade (Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993-1995
7
, 
Albania 1997, Kosovo 1997-1999, Macedonia 2001) and its future sometimes 
is still questionable since this conflict may reappear primarily because of the 
independence of Kosovo. The main question and the major challenge for the 
entire region is (and always has been) how to prevent such events occurring in 
the future? But before discussing any solution or precise set of policies 
targeted at conflict resolution or at least at conflict transformation in the 
region, it is crucial that we first examine the roots causing such conflicts and 
try to understand how the conflicts emerged and escalated in the Balkan region 
and the motives behind them.  
 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
From a theoretical point of view there seem to be two mainstream 
arguments on the conditions that generate and favour violent conflicts. On the 
one hand there is the primordialist approach
8
 which puts the emphasis on the 
role of ethnicity as being a primary cause generating violent conflicts. On the 
other hand there is the modernist approach
9
 which tries to search for causes 
based on the economic, political, and ideological divergences (such as level of 
poverty, social class belonging etc) rather than stressing the ethnicity issue. 
The primordialist versus modernist model embeds a number of characteristics 
that rests, if not opposite, at least apart from each other.  
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If the primordialist arguments are subjective (as ethnicity is a subjective 
sense of belonging), the modernist arguments are more of an objective 
character as they relate to the concrete situation of the citizens. In the 
primordialist model the idea of nation as ethnicity precedes that of the state as 
polity that may include various ethnic groups, whereas the contrary is observed 
in the modernist‘s model. As of such logic the primordialist model is usually 
based on ethnic conditionality and primordial ties (such as blood, kinship, and 
ethnicity) which when different bring up intolerance and exclusion of others 
and may end up in violent conflict. Opposed to an ethnic logic of violence, the 
modernists accept ethnic pluralism. All individuals composing the boundaries 
of the state, irrespectively of their ethnic background, can harmoniously 
coexist. There is no superiority of one ethnic group over the other in the 
modernist model, rather ―the core argument is that economic modernisation 
and the development of the modern state make upward social mobility 
possible‖10.  
While ―primordial perspectives furnish very useful frameworks for 
studying biological, socio-cultural and systemic change and transformation 
over relatively long periods of time and they are receiving serious treatment in 
the fields of international relations and world politics‖11 they do not provide 
the entire picture. The other arguments of ‗modernisation‘ theories are also 
important to be taken into account. Primarily, because they move our analysis 
a step further (from ethnic to civic notion), focusing on the civil conflict where 
the (violent ethnic) conflict is a response to discrimination along cultural lines. 
And secondly, because we add to primordial reasons other more structural 
causes of violent conflict. 
 
The violent conflicts in the Balkan region often have been explained only 
through ethnically-driven characteristics. That is, the primary cause of the 
conflict is the diversity of ethnic composition of the region. This has its part in 
the explanations of the conflicts but this is very superficial and truncated 
analysis. The ethnicity argument can be considered as part of the reason, a path 
dependence problem linked with the unfinished nation-state building process
12
 
in the region. In analysing the conditions of conflicts generated in the Western 
Balkans it is important to add, where relevant, any continuing legacy problems 
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resulting from previous historical experience and the situations they 
experienced. But stressing only these arguments we risk neglecting other 
equally influential and important conditions. We have to acknowledge that the 
entire region, beside the nation-state building process, also underwent a 
process of democracy-building, a new form of regime promoting pluralism. As 
of the liberal democracy model the citizens are all equal irrespective of their 
ethnic background or their political views. In trying to understand the violent 
conflicts in the Balkans one has to consider also the level of democracy these 
countries achieved. The question we need to ask is if the nature of the relation 
between the state and its citizens was democratic enough to respect the 
pluralities of its society. 
In dealing with the Western Balkans the region‘s peculiarity and 
particularity has to be considered. But although there are different reasons and 
specificity of all the cases, if taking them in a comparative analysis it can be 
said that all the cases share some common elements. And as I will argue these 
common causes can be found if we approach from a modernist perspective and 
see the state–citizen relations. Contrary to ―widespread acceptance in academic 
and policy communities that primordial explanations are sufficient to account 
for the violence‖13 I argue that primordialist explanations are not sufficient to 
count as causes of violent conflicts. The role of ethnicity (the major argument 
of primordialists) as a cause generating conflict is not enough to capture all 
violent conflicts in the broad region. The ethnicity argument fails to explain 
not only why an ethnically homogenous country, such as Albania, had violent 
conflicts
14
 but mostly why other heterogeneous countries such as 
Czechoslovakia did not evolve into violent conflicts after its dissolution.  
The point put forward here is that primordialism and its argument of 
ethnicity may favour conflicts but alone it is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for starting up a violent conflict. In order to have a full picture that 
can capture and explain all the cases it is crucial that we take into 
consideration the modernist approach and investigate further the link between 
the state and its citizens.  
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THE QUESTION OF ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY AND 
LEGACIES OF THE PAST 
 
As of the primordialist argument, the aspect related to violent conflicts 
could be the correlation between the homogeneity and acceptance of 
difference. That is to ask whether the states in the Western Balkan region were 
(relatively) ethnic homogeneous. If not, to what extent was diversity accepted? 
The first thing to be noted is that the Western Balkans as a region is ―a 
rich conglomerate of cultures and religions‖15. It is a region of very diverse 
cultures and many religions, where you find the Orthodox and the Catholic as 
well as Sunni and Bektashi or even Jews. Rupnik argues that Western 
―Balkans were much heterogeneous than before and also than the countries of 
Central Eastern Europe‖16. There were these ethnic-cultural differences 
characterizing ex-Yugoslavia that became major disputes for the Western 
Balkans. And this was because ethnic ―differences become a synonym for the 
ingovernability whereas homogeneity has become a pre-requisite for future 
security‖17 in the region. The many different ethnicities in the Balkans meant 
that ―political and ethnic boundaries could not be easily made to coincide‖18. 
The boundaries of nations and states do not overlap instead states can include 
diverse ethnic groups. The presence of different ethnic communities
19
 at least 
partly accounts for the relative strength of nationalist feelings and for the 
occurrence of conflict among the different communities within a state. It is the 
nationalistic feelings of the ethnic groups that are being promoted for political 
purposes. This emotional sociological reaction was so strong and deeply 
rooted into the region. It not only created conflict among ethnicities but it 
engaged states and societies in tremendous violence. At the extreme, some 
authors use ―the myth of mob violence as an attempt to explain ethnic violence 
as a respond to the barbaric and primitive urges‖20 of certain ethnic groups.  
 
In a more sophisticated version these arguments include a ‗path 
dependency‘ logic arguing that the latest Balkan conflicts are nothing but the 
continuation of the past Balkan wars. The inter and intra state tensions and 
their violence as a consequence have deep roots in the past. A past which 
renders the Balkans to a region dominated by ―not only the parcelization of 
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large and viable political units but also a place for a reversion to the tribal, the 
backward, the primitive and the barbarian‖21. During the communist period 
conflicts accumulated but did not develop fully until the fall of communism in 
the 1990s. It has been argued that the fall of the rigid communism, especially 
in the former Yugoslavia, ―led to a ‗rediscovery‘ of the ‗powder keg‘ legacy in 
the Balkans‖22.  
The primordialist explanations of past and current conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia are all derived from the same basic premise: ethnic hatreds and 
fears of the ‗other‘.23 Most of the countries of Western Balkans were seen as 
―fertile ground for the politics of ethnicity owing precisely to the traditional 
ability of nationalism to shape their political cultures‖24. It is all these 
pejorative, traditional characteristics that the region is inheriting from the past 
that can explain the latest conflicts. 
 
 
 
STATE WEAKNESS: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY AND 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
Beside the problems of the past and ethnicity, a growing debate has been 
raised regarding the weakness of states in the region. It has been accepted that 
state weakness is a common feature present throughout the Western Balkans.
25
 
As a consequence of the state weakness in the Western Balkans, a number of 
problems can be observed. Above all, the incapability of the Western Balkan 
state brought about the issue of state legitimacy in citizens‘ perceptions. The 
Western Balkan states become illegitimate in the eyes of many of their 
citizens. This was so because the latter saw the state not only dominated by a 
certain ethnic or political group but more importantly, as serving only that 
group‘s particular interests.26 It was this lack of trust in the institutions of the 
Western Balkans that made the governments seem un-representative and 
disloyal. Such a weakness, primarily related to non-representation of all its 
citizens, resulted into the collapse of the state itself (the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and the Albanian anarchy in 1997
27
).  
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Drawing from the analysis of Bianchini
28
 on the collapse of Yugoslavia it 
can be suggested that the incapability and the failure of all Western Balkan 
states to govern the differences had resulted in a crisis of the system 
representation and of legitimacy of power. This lack of legitimacy was also a 
danger for the Western Balkans‘ new democracy where ―a gradual process of 
erosion and delegitimation may destroy democratic regimes even if their 
surface institutions remain in place‖29. 
 
In describing the situation and in trying to find the reasons that led the 
region towards chaos and violent conflicts it can be suggested that one needs 
to look also at the political cultures of these countries. Taking a political 
culture approach, one should examine whether democratic norms are widely 
held in a given society.
30
 The Western Balkans, contrary to the Central 
European countries, ―differs with regard to the extent their political culture 
resonates with the western liberal values and the extent to which state elites 
were responsive to their societies‖31. If in the CEE countries a pre-democratic 
political culture preceded transition (good examples were Poland and 
Hungary)
32
 easing the way to develop a true pluralist society, that was not the 
case for the Western Balkans. In the post-communist Western Balkans the 
institutions were distrusted because they fail[ed] to deliver to citizens.
33
 Such a 
situation ―undoubted was not a very fertile ground for the introduction of the 
political culture characteristic of the contemporary democratic age‖34. In other 
words, the political culture
35
 of the Western Balkans — the values, beliefs, and 
orientations – has been far from the democratic and liberal norms.  
This is even because of its legacies of the past where ―the more recent 
communist experience had a common impact in the political culture of the 
Balkan countries‖36. Such negative circumstances where ―a political culture of 
dialogue, tolerance, and compromise has shallow roots in much of the 
Balkans‖37 will be reflected in their future political systems. The political 
nature of the state that has been developed in the Western Balkans countries 
was that of authoritarianism and/or nationalism. Though such politics intended 
to bring ‗stability‘ and save the state from disintegrating, it often appeared 
unable to avoid strong confrontation with its citizens and most notably with the 
ethnic groups. In the middle of the 1990s, the ―centralized State of the 
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 9 
sovereign Nation‖ started to promote a new distortion of democratic ideas38 
―unable to function according to demands of modern political institutions: as 
communities of free and equal citizens‖39. It is to be suggested that the 
relationships between the state and its citizens have been the Alfa not only for 
building democracy on the Balkan region but mostly from saving the integrity 
of the state.  
Western Balkan states failed to balance this relationship between state-
politics and civil society. Furthermore, in the Western Balkan countries we had 
―the frequent rise of dictators and arbitrary recourse to power, to the point 
where the individual‘s daily life was systematically conditioned‖40. ―The 
political culture of statism and authoritarianism remains deeply embedded in 
the region‖41 and as a result the Western Balkan states failed to be a 
democratic state which is sufficiently flexible and which can function in a 
(even ethnically) pluralist context. In much of the Western Balkan countries, 
the non-democratic political cultures of authoritarianism and nationalism could 
be found on the political agenda. The very ―narrow nationalistic and populist 
interests had a very strong influence‖42 in shaping state policies. 
 
All of the above arguments lead to the hypothesis that the Western 
Balkans political cultures and state illegitimacy were strong enough to head 
towards a logic of conflict. Taken together, they portray the weakness of the 
Western Balkans states which at the end resulted in disintegration (a violent 
one) in the case of Yugoslavia and disorder in the case of Albania (1997-
1998). 
 
 
THE CONFLICTUAL LOGIC IN STATE-CITIZENS RELATIONS 
 
Generally, the ex-Yugoslav conflicts can be explained as products of the 
undemocratic nature of the old political system.
43
 Such arguments usually 
point out that these legacies, their impact and uneasiness to change that placed 
several obstacles to comprehensive democratization and further developments. 
The question to be addressed here is how did such legacies of the past and 
weakness of the state bring violent dissolution and disorder to the Western 
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Balkan states? How can we encompass all of the above elements in an 
argument valid for all the cases in the Western Balkan region? 
The best explanation to a comparative analysis of the whole Western 
Balkans situation may be found if we look at the citizen-state relations of those 
countries. In the region the old-type of state-citizens relations is the main 
reason that led these countries towards disorder and dissolution.
44
 If the region 
is considered as a whole, it can be argued that from one side we have the 
citizens demanding their rights (in the liberal context) and on the other side 
their respective state failing to provide such rights to their citizens. Being 
recognized a citizen of a country irrespective of your ethnicity or political 
views is a key element of liberal democracy. All citizens should enjoy the 
benefits offered by the states. Any rejection of citizens‘ basic democratic rights 
(right of their language, right to protests or even some autonomy) may lead 
those who are excluded, to becoming a source of threat to the whole polity. 
The kind of relationship between the state and its citizens will depend on the 
state‘s attitude; whether it is open and inclusive or exclusive. When the state 
ceases to represent the interests of all its citizens, the excluded communities 
perceive this as a threat and may react. Such contradictions between state-
citizens have been edging drastically leading the region into dramatically 
violent conflicts. 
 
It is especially so in the Western Balkans states that the state-citizens 
relationship needs to be considered. In all the Western Balkans cases conflict 
has been created as a result of the state exclusion or state dissatisfaction of a 
part (unit) of its community (be that an ethnic or civil group or even a state 
under the Federation) and as a consequence ―those who are excluded become a 
source of threat‖45. The coexistences of different political groups (the Albanian 
case) and/or ethnic groups (the ex-Yugoslav case) have been impossible and 
conflictual. The strong divergences led to a de-facto division of the main 
groups/communities (either political or ethnic) which lived in more or less 
isolation to each other and with a high degree of mutual mistrust.
46
 The state 
itself did not smooth these divergences but on the contrary took one‘s part. 
Discrimination against ethnic communities or political oppositions has been a 
structural feature of the Western Balkan states. Excluded groups/communities 
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may represent a threat to the whole polity because they feel discriminated 
against and threatened by their own members.  
The instability of the Western Balkans‘ state often stems from strong 
divergences regarding the inner communities. The main threat to societal 
security comes when the parties involved (state and guerrillas – as 
representative of ethnic or different political group) attack each other. By 
analogy with the (state) security dilemma
47
, a societal security dilemma might 
use arms to defend their identity and rights while states will do the same to 
defend their sovereignty and security. The problem we are left with is that the 
processes of the resultant societal security dilemma would closely resemble 
those of the (state) security dilemma,
48
 a zero-sum resultant if both the state 
and the societal groups are considered
49
. 
It is this critical moment that requires state attention for finding a balance 
so it can consolidate its democracy and re-examine its relationship with its 
own citizens. In order to increase the chances of consolidating democracy, the 
state should try to give all citizens a common ‗roof‘ by aiming at state policies 
that grant inclusion and equal citizenship to all.
50
 But many governments in the 
Western Balkans did the opposite. They considered the existence of different 
groups/communities (ethnic and political) a threat for them so they exploit and 
deny ‗citizenship‘ and rights to the members of these communities. In this 
way, groups/communities cannot participate in the economic, social and 
political life of the society.
51
 This type of exclusion may bring the state from 
being a solution to being a source of security problems.
52
 That is why the 
object of security should not, however, remain the state, since what is ‗really‘ 
threatened is not an abstraction like the state, but the material well-being of 
individuals.
53
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The disorder and dissolution that dominated in the 1990s in Western 
Balkan countries was complex and its causalities even more so. Adding to this, 
the specificities of each state and/or entity were different. But what can be 
identified as a common denominator is state-citizens relations where the 
common element of the region is the weakness/failure of the state to respond 
to the plurality and needs of its communities. 
The developments of the region were usually seen as legacies of the past. 
The most classic formulation was in the 1996 report of the International 
Commission on the Balkans entitled The Unfinished Peace, which defined the 
major impediments to effective democracy in the Balkans as ―legacies of war, 
of communism, and of history‖54. But the problems of post-communist 
Western Balkans countries were mainly related to the concept of state. The 
structural weakness of the state in shaping societal dynamics constitutes 
another major legacy; usually with the distinct profiles of the individual cases, 
ranging from state weakness without unfinished state building in Albania to 
inconclusive state and nation building in Serbia.
55
 The Western Balkans were 
facing ―a crisis of representation where citizens found themselves alienated 
from the public institutions and even more importantly, the Balkan states 
fail[ed] to safeguard their citizens‘ rights‖56. 
These entire arguments describe the situation of the Western Balkan states 
which at least in general can be characterized as ‗failed‘. On the agenda of 
Western Balkans politicians was concern with state building (in the literal 
sense of the word), which in the major part failed, resulting in civil conflict. 
The region‘s main concern of that period was with nation- and state-building, a 
process that is not yet accomplished. Even today, the region‘s profile is blurred 
where we have a mixture of not only weak states, but also some new states 
and/or semi-protectorates.
57
 This ongoing process of civic building has faced 
many difficulties of past legacies, the equilibrium of ethnic or political 
composition and legitimacy as political cultures raising the issues of social 
security dilemmas within the state itself. Any threat to citizens‘ safety and 
freedom, which derive from the exclusion of any constituent group/community 
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(since human beings aggregate in diverse communal groups) within the state, 
may turn to a threat of the whole community. 
 
What is clear from the analysis presented in this paper is that the violent 
conflict has been first and foremost a result of the improper (undemocratic) 
relations of state-citizens which in the Western Balkans states has caused a 
societal security dilemma that brought many times violent conflicts for the 
whole community. The genesis and escalation of a conflict is a multilayered 
process involving at least two parts, rather among communities or among a 
community and the state. That is why the ultimate aim of the state should be 
the achievement of security for all its citizens and not only for a few. 
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